We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Our method can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. We parallel the standard revealed preference theory, which does require rationality, by modeling choices "as if" they were the result of a speci…c decision making process. However, in place of the usual preference relation whose maximization induces the observations, we explain choice as arising from a compromise among a set of simultaneously-held, con ‡icting preference relations. We use these preference relations as the basis to measure the decision maker's welfare. In general our method does not yield a unique set of explanatory preferences. Thus we characterize all the explanatory combinations of preferences any one of which could generate the data. We use this set of explanations to compute bounds on welfare changes. We show that some standard results of rational choice theory can be extended to irrational decision makers. The theory can be used to explore a number of context-dependent choice patterns found in psychological experiments. JEL Classi…cation: D01, D11, D60
Introduction
The use of observed choice behavior to make inferences about welfare is one of the basic methods of economics. This classical "revealed preference" method is based on the assumption that choice is rational. Our objective is to extend this method to choice functions that are not rational, while following its fundamental logic and objectives as closely as possible.
The standard economic procedure consists of three steps. First there is given a set of choice problems, each of which is a subset of the set of all possible alternatives, and an observed choice made by a decision maker for each problem. These problems and observations constitute the data. The data may or may not be complete, as some possible choice problems may not be included. It is assumed that the data contain no contradictions of rationality -no switches between observed choices when both remain available, and no possibility for indirectly inferring that choice is self-contradictory, such as the observation of cycles. The second step in the revealed preference methodology is where the key theorem lies. Provided that the set of choice problems is "rich enough", the theory tells us that a preference relation can be constructed with the property that the decision maker is behaving "as if" he or she were optimizing it. When the data are not su¢ cient to de…ne a unique consistent preference relation, there is still a set of preferences relations that can explain them. 1 In all cases, revealed preference theory imagines that the data is generated as if some preference relation were being optimized. The third step uses this preference relation both to predict behavior "out of sample" and to measure welfare. 2 For choice problems outside the original set one can calculate the choice that would be made and one can evaluate whether or not this problem represents an improvement over any other choice problem. If the preference relation is given a cardinal representation, this numerical function can be used as a quantitative welfare measure and for the purpose of computing interpersonal compensations.
The assumption of rationality is, however, not valid for many if not most data sets that have been encountered. Tests of rationality on ordinary de- 1 Afriat's procedure …nds one of them (Afriat (1967) ). Mas-Colell (1978) gives an approximation result: The more data the smaller the set of preferences that remain consistent with them. 2 If there are multiple preference relations consistent with the data one should make predictions based on each of them, and measure welfare using each of them. This procedure is not followed in practice, however. mand data fail not because of large error terms but because the hypothesis is demonstrably false. 3 Choice data in psychological experiments or in …eld-based observations also contain internal inconsistencies and contradictions. It is frequently the case that choice varies systematically with the context in which it is made, refuting any internal consistency axiom that might be applied. 4 Revealed preference theory cannot be used as a basis for welfare analysis because rationality cannot reasonably be assumed. There simply is no single preference relation that generates the data, and thus there is no preference relation that can serve as a basis for welfare measurement. 5 In this paper we retain the objective of constructing a model for the decision maker's observed choice. We seek a model that works whether or not these choices contain contradictions to rationality. Our strategy is to look for a set of preference relations and a method for aggregating them that work in the same "as if" sense that is employed in the standard theory. Our interpretation of this set of preference relations is that they represent multiple con ‡icting motivations that in ‡uence the decision maker's choice. Thus we model decision makers who are "con ‡icted" in that they simultaneously hold multiple preferences over the alternatives. We want the data to tell us what con ‡icts the decision maker might be experiencing; and we respect all these con ‡icting preferences when evaluating welfare. It is in this sense that we retain the central principle of choice-based welfare economics that has been the hallmark of microeconomics.
Our central de…nition is that of an "explanation": A set of preferences and an aggregation method such that this method, applied to these preferences, reproduces the observed choice at every datum.
Aggregating con ‡icting preferences is the domain of social choice theory, 3 See, for example, Deaton-Muellbauer (1980) . Rationality in demand is tested via the implication that under rational choice the Slutzsky substitution terms are symmetric. 4 Rubinstein-Salant (2007) describe a theory of "choice with frames" which can explain some forms of inconsistency of this type. Their approach is related ours in that they seek a general theory that can incorporate any pattern of irrationality and derive explanations from the resulting data. However, they seek explanations that are unique (uncon ‡icted) preference orderings that apply over a part of the domain of problems, and seek a parsimonious partition of the domain within each element of which the preference is constant. We seek combinations of (con ‡icted) preferences which are held at all problems in the domain and whose aggregation tracks the observed choice over all of the domain. 5 The need to extend welfare methods in economics to account for quasirational behavior is discussed in Berheim-Rangel (2005), Gul-Pessendorfer (2005) , and Koszegi-Rabin (2007) . the most important result of which is Arrow's Theorem. This theorem tells us that any non-trivial aggregation of preferences must display inconsistencies. Democracy and collective rationality are incompatible. This is usually taken as a negative, disappointing, result. For our theory, however, this result is a source of strength. Because we explain irrationality as a necessary consequence of compromise among con ‡icting objectives, we seek a type of converse to social choice theory : We ask what forms of con ‡ict and compromise can play the same "as if" role in an explanation of an irrational choice pattern that a single preference relation plays for rational data in revealed preference theory?
Our results are as follows: First we show that there are generally many explanations for any …nite data set, and that they form a convex subset in the relevant space. When evaluating welfare using our method, we obtain a range of welfare measures due to the multiplicity of the explanations. 6 The geometric structure of the set of all explanations makes it feasible to compute bounds on welfare.
Second we show that any choice function, no matter how irrational, can be explained by our method. One may construe this as a negative result in that the theory is therefore not testable. We do not, however, view it in this light. Although there are no logically-imposed limits on the extent of the irrationality that can be encompassed by this theory, highly irrational choice functions may require explanations by very strange sets of simultaneously held preferences. If it were possible to rule out those combinations of preferences either by assumption or on the basis of other evidence, one could provide testable restrictions on the choice functions that can be induced.
Third, we show that although the decision maker may be irrational in some respects, it is possible to preserve the conclusions of rational choice theory provided the choice data satis…es a limited consistency property. Specifically, suppose that a change in the set of opportunities causes a change in outcome from y to x and that y is never chosen at any situation where both are available. Then, even though the choice function may be highly irrational in other respects, the consistency of choice as it pertains to x and y guarantees that there exist explanations that give all the weight possible to preferences in which x is indeed preferred to y. Thus the bene…cial nature of the change in the available set can be insulated from observed irrationalities that are not relevant to the change at hand.
Fourth, we explore a converse to this result. If the choice data indicates a "preference reversal" between two alternatives x and y, we show that a typical explanation of this behavior must entail preferences that are in con ‡ict with respect to the ranking of x and y. Thus, ordinal welfare inferences associated to changes in the choice from x to y will not be possible.
Fifth we go beyond the above results which rely on only choice-based information. When some cardinal, non-choice based information is available, we can derive more detailed welfare conclusions. The idea is, again, to parallel rationality-based theory, which constructs cardinal measures of welfare based on assumptions beyond the rationality of the choices observed. 7 We show that the most optimistic and most pessimistic bounds on welfare are always realized within a special highly structured family of explanations that we characterize. Because of the complexity of the general set of explanations for choice functions, this result drastically simpli…es the calculation of the best and worst case scenarios for welfare change. As an application of this theory we show what it implies in the case of three alternatives -a case that has been thoroughly documented in psychological experiments.
The accumulation of laboratory and …eld-based evidence of irrationality over the past twenty years has led other authors to explain choice either by sequential procedures involving multiple objectives, or as the outcome of a game in which these con ‡icting objectives play strategically against each other. Papers in the non-strategic, sequential category posit additional information about the alternatives in order to structure the procedure. For example, the alternatives may be described by a list of attributes which could be considered in a …xed order to eliminate or reorder the alternatives. Observed choice is explained "as if" this process were followed by the decision maker. From a welfare point of view, however, it is not clear which of the attributes is most salient -or, if preferences over attributes are to be combined, how 7 These assumptions might take several forms. One would use studies of brain function, other physiometric measures, or self-reported measures of satisfaction as the basis for the cardinalization. Another might use further data on choices among lotteries, and then, under the assumption that these choices ful…ll an independence condition, would de…ne a cardinal utility from the observed risk preferences. Finally, if the choices are over commodity bundles and one of the commodities, typically money, is assumed to enter preferences in a quasi-linear form, then this commodity could be used to perform the scaling. All of these methods thus would rely on additional axioms and assumptions to produce a cardinalization.
should they be weighted. Classic studies in this mode are Tversky (1972) , Sha…r (1993) , and Sha…r-Simonson-Tversky (1993). More recent theoretical papers along the same lines are Ahn-Ergin (2007) and Manzini-Mariotti (2007) .
Models of irrational choice in the game theoretic category recognize the existence of multiple con ‡icting preferences and impose strategic structure on the problem within which these preferences interact. These studies are attractive because many people do consciously question their own motivations, engage in introspection, and sometimes consciously act so as to suppress motivations that they deem harmful to their own true interests. The di¤erence between these models and ours is that they take the nature of the multiple selves to be exogenous, using a …xed structure of these selves to generate the irrational observations. We, on the other hand, ask the data to generate the multiple explanatory preferences, and their relative strengths, for us. When the nature of the decision problem has enough structure that one can identify classical motivations, such as patience and impulsiveness, the strategy followed by these strategically-based papers can pay handsome dividends. Our structure is perhaps more applicable in general context-dependent situations where the detailed nature of the alternatives is unknown to the analyst and a priori assumptions about which preference plays which strategic role in the game may not be appropriate. Important papers in this strategic mold include Strotz (1956) , Schelling (1984) , Bernheim-Rangel (2005) , GulPessendorfer (2001) , and Fudenberg-Levine (2006) . In many of these papers the pattern of choice that is generated by game theoretic interactions among the preferences displays enough consistency to be "explained" as the maximization of a composite, aggregated preference. These papers do not address the question of how to measure welfare. It would seem that one either would have to accept the aggregated preference as the appropriate welfare measure, or as in the case of the sequential procedures, welfare analysis would depend upon making one of the underlying preferences more salient than the others. 8 Our paper is, to our knowledge, the …rst to take a general choice-based approach to the problem of aggregating con ‡icting motivations. We treat both the alternatives and the motivations symmetrically, imposing no structure on the characteristics of the alternatives. In this way, we allow the observed choice behavior to be the sole determinant of the welfare analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: The basic set up, notation and concepts are given in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to a three-alternative example, typical of psychological evidence on the presence of context e¤ects, involving choice among delayed payo¤s. Section 4 gives an analysis of the general three alternative case. In Section 5 we deal with the general case, showing that the results for three alternatives generalize without much change. Section 6 is devoted to the question of how a limited, weak form of rationality concerning the comparison of two particular alternatives, which we call pairwise coherence, allows some fundamental welfare conclusions to survive in the presence of considerable irrationality of the choice function more generally. Through Section 6 we are making only ordinal comparisons. In section 7 we allow for each explanatory preference to be given a cardinal representation, and we adopt a utilitarian criterion when aggregating multiple con ‡icting preferences in an explanation. In this framework we evaluate welfare bounds for expansions of the sets of alternatives and for some particular well-documented irrational behavior patterns in the three alternative case. A brief concluding section follows. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Choice and Welfare Measurement

Con ‡icting Motivations and a Voting Model of Choice
The set of all possible outcomes is X. A typical outcome is a 2 X. A set of available alternatives A X is a choice situation. An observation is a pair (a; A) with a 2 A. We observe choices from a domain A of choice situations A. Thus the data we need to explain is a choice function c : A ! X summarizing all the observations (c(A); A) for A 2 A. We will take A to be the set of all non-empty subsets of A unless otherwise noted. 9;10 9 One of the strengths of revealed preference theory is that it uses the structure of the available sets, in particular the linear structure of consumers'budget sets, to make indirect inferences about preferences. This enables the construction of a preference relation from families A that are far smaller than the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Moreover, Forges and Minelli (2006) , and Fostel, Scarf and Todd (2004) have extended standard revealed preference theory to the case of non-linear budget sets, and have shown how sparse A can be while still enabling the construction of an explanatory preference relation. 10 Our model assumes that choice is single-valued. This assumption is not hard to generalize but doing so would introduce considerable additional notation and complexity
The set of all strict orders on X is denoted . An individual is identi…ed with a probability distribution 2 , the set of all probability measures over . Our interpretation of is that it describes the simultaneously held preferences that motivate an individual, as well as the strengths of each of these motivations. For this reason we use the term motivations when speaking about the orders . We call a population of motivations or, for brevity, a population. An individual's choice behavior is to be explained as if the population were aggregated by some …xed procedure, described by a correspondence v :
A ! X. We will call v a voting rule. The interpretation of a voting rule is that if the population of motivations is and the available set of alternatives is A then v( ; A) is the set of outcomes that can result when this population votes over the set A.
11 Further speci…cations and restrictions on the voting rules that we consider will be discussed below in section 2.2.
Thus, we are given a choice function c and seek to explain c "as if" it were generated by an individual who is characterized by a pair ( ; v). For a …xed voting rule v the set of populations such that ( ; v) is an explanation of c is denoted E(c; v). If the voting rule were not restricted in some way any choice function can be "explained", and any population can be part of that explanation. One could simply let the voting rule ignore and chose c(A) whenever the available set is A. Thus all interesting conclusions of our model are driven by the restrictions that we place on the form of the voting rule v.
Let us restrict the voting rule by requiring that v lie within a speci…ed family of rules V . The smaller V is, the fewer explanations of c there will be. Thus it becomes interesting to ask, for a particular family V , whether a given choice rule c can be explained by any ( ; v) with v 2 V . If such explanations do exist, the populations that are part of these explanations will re ‡ect the restriction to v 2 V as well as the rationality or irrationality that is not germane to the basic decision theoretic and welfare measurement issues. 11 Notice that we do allow v to be set-valued. The voting rules we use in this paper, however, have non-singleton values only on a null set of populations, and thus our speci…cation of v as a correspondence is for technical correctness only, and not for the purpose of allowing multi-valued choice at some observations. of c. For example, if c actually satis…es the axiom of revealed preference, and V includes voting rules that respect unanimity (c(A) is the maximal element of on A whenever is a point mass at ), then there will be a "rational explanation" of c. There may, however, be other explanations of c as well. To take one more example, if v 2 V were Plurality rule (c(A) is the element that maximizes the weight on the …rst choice of within A, under the distribution ), then a cyclic choice pattern c will be explainable by ( ; v) provided that admits the required Condorcet paradox. In this paper we explore explanations that are based on a particular family of voting rules, the scoring rules V s , such as Borda count or plurality. Further details on the construction of scoring rules are given shortly in Section 2.2. Given a choice function c, the set of populations that are associated with some scoring rule explanation of c is E(c) = [ v2Vs E(c; v). This is the set 2 such that ( ; v) explains c over A for some v 2 V s . For the family of scoring rule explanations of this paper we are interested primarily in three questions. Which choice functions c have explanations? And for a given choice function c, what is the set E(c)? We provide answers to these questions in sections 4 and 5. Finally, given that we have restricted the explanatory populations to lie in E(c), what can be said about the change in the decision maker's welfare when the set of available alternatives varies? We approach this welfare question in sections 6 and 7.
Scoring rules ignore cardinal information and thus represent one endpoint on a continuum of ways in which actual choice can depart from a true welfaremaximizing choice. Since irrationality is prevalent in many data sets, there must be some departure from welfare maximization. We hasten to add that there are many other ways of modeling the failure fully to capture cardinal welfare considerations in the choice process. The aggregation of con ‡icting motivations via scoring rules is a particularly tractable way of expressing the "error" that a decision maker makes when failing to attain his or her own true welfare optimum. Moreover, as we will show, scoring rule explanations are particularly powerful in that they can account for any form of irrationality whatsoever.
Scoring Rules and Explanations
A scoring rule v 2 V s is characterized by a set of jXj 1 scoring vectors f k g k2f2;:::;jXjg , where k is the scoring vector that applies when the available set has k alternatives. We write v = ( 2 ; 3 ; :::; jXj ) and the k-alternative scoring vector k = ( The result of a vote under v by a population when the set of alternatives is A is the set of alternatives that receives the highest score, that is,
Examples of scoring rules include Plurality, the Borda count, and Antiplurality. Scoring rules are a special case of general positional voting rules.
13
Example 1 (Plurality) Plurality is characterized by weights j k = 0 for all k 2 f2; :::; jXjg; j 2 f2; :::; kg. Thus, scoring vectors have the form s k = (1; 0; :::; 0).
Example 2 (Borda)
The Borda count is characterized by weights
, k 2 f2; :::; jXjg, j 2 f1; :::; kg.
cardinal intensity information to compare the in ‡uence of di¤erent motivations. See Green and Hojman (2007) . 13 General positional voting rules are those rules that depend on the rank orders of the alternatives. In scoring rules this dependence is restricted to be additive -resulting in the scores s(a; A; ). An axiomatic speci…cation can be found in Young (1975) .
Example 3 (Antiplurality) Antiplurality is characterized by weights j k = 1 for all k 2 f2; :::; jXjg and 1 j < k, and
For any scoring voting rule 2 = (1; 0), so that when deciding between only two available alternatives, all scoring rules are identical. Note also that, in the case of three alternatives, a scoring rule v is determined by a single parameter, the weight 2 3 assigned to the second best choice from three alternatives.
We conclude this section with an important remark. For a …xed scoring rule and a choice function c we can rewrite
as a set of choice inequalities
A key property of these inequalities is their linearity in the population strengths vector . Each inequality de…nes a half space in the space of populations . As a result, the set of explanations E(c; v) for a …xed voting rule v is the polytope de…ned by the set of these linear inequalities for each a 2 A and each A 2 A.
14 Thus, the set E(c) = [ v2Vs E(c; v) of all populations that can be part of an explanation is a union of polytopes, which is not necessarily itself a polytope. We discuss the geometric structure of E(c) and E(c; v) for v 2 V s below.
Welfare Measurement
We use the set of explanations to derive conclusions about welfare changes as the available set varies. Initially, in sections 4, 5, and 6, we restrict ourselves to ordinally-based conclusions. Since a purely ordinally-based theory cannot reference any intensities of gain or loss, such an analysis can produce a welfare judgment only if all the explanatory motivations that get positive weight agree with each other. Later in the paper, in section 7, we examine the case of cardinal preferences, which as mentioned above will need to be based on non-choice based information. When such information is available we choose to measure welfare using the natural utilitarian criterion to allow tradeo¤s across motivations-adding the welfare changes across the population and weighting according to the relevant . In this case unambiguous welfare improvement occurs if the utilitarian sum increases for all explanations in E(c).
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Formally speaking, we approach welfare measurement in the following sequence of steps:
(W2) Given a family of voting rules V compute the set of populations E(c; V ) = [ v2V E(c; v) that can be part of an explanation.
When only ordinal, choice-based, information is to be used in the welfare analysis, we then proceed to step (W3, Ordinal) (W3) (Ordinal) Given a change in the set of opportunities from A to B, test whether there exists 2 E(c; V ) such that c(A) and c(B) are ranked in the same way by all for which ( ) > 0:
For a given change in the available set, step (W3) focusses our attention on the subset of choice functions for which unambiguous welfare evaluations are possible for some change in the set of opportunities, de…ned as follows.
De…nition 3 Let F = (A; B) 2 A A denote a change in the opportunity set from A to B. A choice function c is said to admit an ordinal welfare inference at F if there exists 2 E(c; V ) such that there is unanimity with regard to the ranking of c(A) and c(B) among the preferences that are given strictly positive weight ( ) > 0.
Our de…nition of ordinal welfare inferences relies only on the existence of a non-con ‡icted explanation. This existence requirement might seem weak at …rst glance as there could be several con ‡icted explanations of the behavior. It must be noted, however, that step (W3) is a natural generalization of welfare inference in the rational choice model. Indeed, the traditional framework requires the choice data c to satisfy the axiom of revealed preference and, given that, welfare inferences are performed using explanations that put all the weight on a single preference.
If cardinal preference information is available as a basis for welfare measurement it can be summarized by u : X ! R, which de…nes a cardinal utility function u( ; ) for each 2 . Then it is natural to compute utilitarian the welfare functional f W that aggregates the cardinal information. 16 
De…nition 4
The utilitarian welfare functional f W based on the cardinal-
If cardinal preference information is available we do not need the unanimity criterion of step (W3). Welfare can be evaluated directly:
(Cardinal) For each 2 E(c; V ) compute the welfare measure at A based on : 
A Motivating Example
To make our ideas concrete, we consider a motivating example that concerns the choice over consumption that is received after a known time delay. Each alternative a is a particular consumption level m a and an associated delay 16 The results of section 7 generalize if the cardinal intensities associated to each motivation depend on the set of available alternatives. If the latter holds, the cardinalization u : X A ! R de…nes a utility function u( ; A; ) depends explicitly on the choice situation A and (3) is replaced by the choice-set dependent welfare measure f W (x; A; ; u) = P 2 u(x; A; ) ( ). This might be a natural assumption if regret or, more generally, well-being is a¤ected not only by consequences but also the available choice-set .
t a . We will write a = (m a ; t a ): We use this example to illustrate the welfare measurement method proposed above in a familiar economic context. Take three alternatives x = (10; 0), y = (15; 1) and z = (35; 2). The choice function de…ned on subsets of these three alternatives will be cyclical on pairwise choices, and will select x when all three are available: c(fx; yg) = x; c(fy; zg) = y; c(fx; zg) = z; and c(fx; y; zg) = x:
This pattern is typical of experimental evidence and is a simpli…cation of examples in Tversky (1969) and Roelofsma and Read (2000) .
To shorten the notation slightly we write xyz to indicate that the preference ordering under consideration ranks x above y and y above z. Thus the six possible di¤erent orderings i ; i = 1; :::; 6 are:
One can generate all of these preferences from a standard discounted utility formulation u i ((m; t)) =ũ i (m)e %t in which the Bernoulli utilityũ i (m) function varies but the time preference parameter % is common across the six motivations. Moreover the Bernoulli utilities can be chosen so that they are concave in m.
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Now let us examine some of the explanations that exist for the cyclical c that has been observed. Given the population, when the set of alternatives has only two elements, all voting rules produce the same result. Thus, to produce a cycle on the three two-element sets, the population must be display a Cordorcet pattern. For example, = ( with the majority in favor of the indicated choice in each instance. Other populations produce the same cyclic choice patterns, but with di¤er-ent majorities of the motivations in favor of the winner. A borderline case is the population = ( ; 0) where x is unanimously preferred to y and there is a tie on the other two two-element sets. Now we consider the one additional piece of evidence -the fact that x is chosen from the threeelement set. To be part of an explanation, the population must also lead to this choice, and here the voting rule is relevant to the outcome. If we examine Plurality rule, for example, then = ( on this set, and = ( ; 0) produces a tie between x and z. Thus these 's can combine with the Plurality rule to form explanations of c, but they do not make c(A) the unique score maximizer at every A. Such ties can be avoided at voting rules other than Plurality. At Antiplurality or Borda = ( ; 0) produces x as the unique outcome because z is last in 1 and x is second in 5 , while = ( ; 0) still produces a tie for these voting rules.
The case of = ( ; 0) is quite interesting because arbitrarily close to this population are the populations = ( ; 0). Each of these populations, together with some non-Plurality voting rules, uniquely select all the required choices. Moreover, as can be made arbitrarily small, almost all the weight is placed on preferences that favor x over y.
Let us now consider the evidence presented by this choice function as to the pairwise preference that might be held by this decision maker. For the pair fx; yg the evidence is unambiguous that x > y. Whenever both x and y are available, x is selected -independent of the presence or absence of z. For the pair fx; zg there is contradictory evidence since the presence of y causes x to be chosen, but z is chosen in y's absence. For the pair fy; zg the evidence favors y > z, but as we do not know what the second choice would have been from fx; y; zg, where x is chosen, the evidence for the preference x > y must be based solely on choices from the three pairs of alternatives.
We would like to be able to draw inferences as to whether an expansion is the set of alternatives is good for the decision maker, as it would be for someone who is rational. Consider the expansion from A = fy; zg to X = fx; y; zg and the consequent change in the choice from y = c(A) to x = c(X). Is there an explanation consistent with the evidence that x is always chosen in preference to y? We can answer this question in the a¢ rmative by considering the explanation of c via the population = ( ; 0). In this explanation there is near unanimity that this expansion is bene…cial. Thus we see that the irrationality of cyclic choice does not stand in the way of some explanations which very strongly indicate that the switch from y to x is bene…cial. This example suggests, therefore, that a revealed preference between two alternatives can be consistent with an arbitrarily large a majority in favor of the better one, despite unequivocal evidence of irrationality involving alternatives other than these two. We will see in Theorem 3 that this is a general proposition.
Considering the other two expansions in the available set of alternatives leads us to di¤erent conclusions. Going from fx; yg to fx; y; zg is irrelevant to welfare, as x is chosen in both instances. Going from fx; zg to fx; y; zg switches the choice from z to x. One can show, however, that there is no explanation of c that puts all the weight, or approximately all the weight, either on preferences concentrated on x > z or on preferences concentrated on z > x. Non-trivial con ‡ict is a necessary ingredient in any explanation of this choice function, as far as the pair fx; zg is concerned. Therefore, as we are restricting ourselves to ordinal information about the motivations, there is no explanation from which we can decide which of these alternatives is preferred. The fact that this type of ambiguous welfare conclusion is an unavoidable consequence of irrational choice patterns is a general proposition -see Theorem 5 . Now let us turn to the case in which cardinal welfare measures are available for each of the motivations. Cardinal information in our model must come from observations beyond the choice function itself. We need such cardinal information if we are going to make welfare comparisons in ambiguous cases such as that of x versus z above. For concreteness, let us use as this cardinal measurement the parameters of Appendix A in the Bernoulli utility that represents each motivation.
For these parameters we can see that quantitative welfare measurement is ambiguous in sign even for an expansion for which there is unambiguous evidence of pairwise preference -as in the comparison of x to y. This can be shown by considering the following two explanations of c: ( ; v P ), with = (:43; 0; :40; 0; :17; 0) and v P is Plurality rule, and ( 0 ; v A ), with 0 = (:40; 0; :17; 0; :40; :03) and v A is Antiplurality. W (fy; zg; c; ; u) = 1:176 and W (fx; y; zg; c; ; u) = 1:165, yielding a decrease in utilitarian welfare. On the other hand, for the population 0 we obtain W (fy; zg; c; 0 ; u) = 1:149 and W (fx; y; zg; c; 0 ; u) = 1:174, so that the welfare change for the explanation 0 is positive. Thus in this example the sign of the cardinal welfare evaluation for the expansion from fy; zg to fx; y; zg is ambiguous, even though the decision maker has revealed no irrationality with respect to the two alternatives that are chosen before and after the expansion. We return to this issue in sections 6 and 7.
Choice Rules in the Three Alternative Case
We provide a classi…cation of choice rules and a characterization of the choice functions that can be explained by our theory above for the case in which X has three elements. The results for the general case are presented in Section 5. For concreteness, let X = fx; y; zg.
The Four Choice Rules
If X has three alternatives there are four possible choice situations, three corresponding to choices from two-element subsets of X and one for choice over the entire set. This yields twenty-four possible choice rules for the threealternative case 18 which can be classi…ed into four choice patterns: Seemingly Rational Choice, Second Place Choice, Third Place Choice and Cyclic Choice. Rules in the same class are formally identical modulo a permutation of the alternatives.
The …rst three classes of choice rules have in common the existence of an alternative x r which is "Condorcet winner" in pairwise contests. Let x s and x t denote the other alternatives, where x s = c(Xnfx r g) is the "second-place" choice and x t is the "third-place" choice, x t = 2 ffx r ; x s g. When pairwise choice exhibits a Condorcet winner in this three-alternative environment, pairwise choice will have "revealed" a preference relation x r x s x t . For example, if X = fx; y; zg the following choice function c(fx; yg) = x; c(fx; zg) = x; c(fy; zg) = y has x r = x, x s = y and x t = z which is consistent with the order "x over y over z". The question remaining, however, is whether this preference relation also characterizes the choice when all three alternatives are available.
The three classes of choice rules are de…ned by the choice from the triple. If c(X) = x r the choice rule is Seemingly Rational. If c(X) = x s the choice rule displays Second Place Choice. If c(X) = x t the choice rule displays Third Place Choice. Clearly, second and third place choice are not consistent with explaining choice based on the maximization of a single preference relation.
When pairwise choice does not exhibit a Condorcet winner, Cyclic Choice, the fourth class of choice rules, exists. For example, c(fx; yg) = x; c(fx; zg) = z; c(fy; zg) = y:
This example exhibits the cycle "x over y over z over x".
19
We conclude this section remarking that the three patterns inconsistent with rational behavior have been documented by the experimental psychology and decision-making literature that focuses on context e¤ects in choice with multi-attribute alternatives. A classic paper by Tversky (1969) and more recent work by Roelofsma and Read (2000) show that cyclic choice can arise systematically. There is also robust evidence of Second Place Choice, as shown by Simonson (1989) . Third place choice seems to be more elusive but Redelmeier and Sha…r (1995) …nds this pattern. 20 
Characterizing Explanations in the Three-Alternative Case
In the case of three alternatives the set of all orderings has six elements. As in Section 3, we adopt the concise notation that, for a generic 2 ; if a 1 is preferred to a 2 and a 2 is preferred to a 3 we write = a 1 a 2 a 3 . With this notation the six strict orderings are 1 = xyz; 2 = xzy 3 = yzx; 4 = yxz; 5 = zxy; 6 = zyx and a population of motivations 2 6 is a probability distribution over these six orderings. For short, we write i = ( i ) for each i = 1; 2; :::; 6:
As mentioned earlier, with three alternatives a positional voting procedure v is determined by a single free parameter . We are interested in characterizing the set of choice functions that can be explained 19 The absence of a Condorcet winner necessitates the existence of a pairwise cycle with three or more elements. Consider the directed graph in which each vertex is an alternative in X and there exists a directed edge from a vertex a to another vertex a 0 if c(fa; a 0 g) = a. If c does not have a Condorcet winner this means that each vertex has an outgoing edge and, since there are a …nite number of edges, the graph must contain a directed cycle. 20 The prevailing psychology theories include sequential decision-making procedures such as elimination by aspects or theories based on context-dependent salience such as asymmetric dominance. A more comprehensive theory called reason-based choice is proposed by Sha…r, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) . This theory, based on the idea that the context determines which among of many con ‡icting reasons prevails in a given choice situation, is close in spirit to the model presented in this paper.
by these rules. As illustrated by the following examples, given a positional voting rule v, if ( ; v) is an explanation of a choice function c then …ve choice inequalities must be satis…ed.
Example 4 Explaining Seemingly Rational Choice
Consider the following Seemingly Rational choice function c(fx; yg) = x; c(fx; zg) = x; c(fy; zg) = y; c(fx; y; zg) = x:
For an explanation based on voting rule v 2 [0; 1] the choice inequalities in (1) translate into
Inequalities (7a)-(7c) correspond to choices from pairs of alternatives and express respectively that x beats y in the pairwise contest, x beats z in the pairwise contest, and y beats z in the pairwise contest. Inequalities (7d)-(7e) correspond to choice from the triple and express that x has a higher score than y and z when all three alternatives are available. E(c; v), where c is the seemingly rational choice function, is the set of solutions to these …ve inequalities under the restriction that is in the …ve-dimensional simplex 6 .
Example 5 Explaining Second-Place Choice
Consider the Second-Place Choice rule c(fx; yg) = x; c(fx; zg) = x; c(fy; zg) = y; c(fx; y; zg) = y:
An explanation of c based on v must satisfy inequalities (7a)-(7c) and
These two inequalities express the fact that y beats x in the triple y beats z in the triple.
The following Theorem characterizes the set of choice observations that can be explained using a scoring rule.
Theorem 1 Suppose that jXj = 3. For any choice function c there exists a full measure set of explanations E(c).
The content of Theorem 1 is that this theory of choice is rich enough to explain any choice function on three-element sets. The result can be viewed as a limitation of the theory as it also implies that it cannot be rejected based on choice data from three-element sets. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the psychology evidence suggests that in fact all choice patterns can be observed. Finally, the speci…c structure of a choice problem may impose constraints on the motivations and con ‡icts that are feasible. For example, we may know from external evidence that certain "reasons" or motivations are simply absent in a given choice problem. Alternatively we may deem certain preferences to be a priori unreasonable and we may restrict the theory to give them a zero weight in any explanation. Such reduction of the set of possible orderings could result a greatly reduced set of explanations, indeed it can produce situations in which some choice patterns have no explanation within the theory as illustrated by the example below. Without such external restrictions however, the theorem above tells us that no behavior pattern can be ruled out a priori.
Example 6 Each alternative a = (m a ; e a ), a 2 X, is a job opportunity with two attributes. To …x ideas m a is a monetary compensation for a and e a is an "ethical reward" measured in a numerical scale. Alternatives are such that m x > m y > m z and e z > e y > e z . 21 There are two motivations that rank according to one attribute alone. Using the above notation, the motivation ranking according to the monetary compensation is 1 and the motivation ranking according to the ethical reward is 6 . Thus, the domain of populations is restricted by 1 + 6 = 1. It is straightforward to check that if c display either cyclic choice or third-place choice then E(c) is either empty or has measure zero. 
is an explanation of c. The fact that third-place choice is ruled out by the Borda count illustrates that restricting the set of voting rules can also reduce the behaviors explained by the theory (see also Proposition 2).
We note that each set E(c; v) is a polytope de…ned by inequalities just like those in (7a)-(7e). Thus, for each v, the simplex of motivations 6 is cut up into 24 pieces each of which is a polyhedron within which the choice rule is constant. 22 All of these polyhedra are pointed cones that touch at one point, the pro…le that puts equal weight to each ordering in . The other vertices of each polyhedron are in the boundary of the simplex and the polyhedra that contains a vertex of the simplex -a pure motivation-is associated with seemingly rational choice.
The General Case
The results presented for the three-alternative case generalize for any number of alternatives.
Theorem 2 For any choice function c there exists a full measure set of explanations E(c).
The Theorem follows from the following Lemma, which is originally due to Saari (1989 Saari ( , 2001 ). 23 Lemma 1 For any function c and almost any voting rule v there exists a full measure set of explanations E(c; v) based on v. 22 Any element of the polytope E(c; v) is a convex combination of its vertices. For jXj = 3, the vertices of E(c; v) for each type of choice function c and arbitrary voting rule v are available at the authors web pages. 23 The authors thank J.P. Benoit for pointing this out. The proof presented in the Appendix uses an argument similar to Saari (1989) .
A proof is provided in the Appendix. We outline the main argument of the proof. Observe that each voting rule v de…nes a linear scoring map S :
! where is the set of populations and =
A2A
A is a space of all possible scores, with A R jAj . Indeed, for each subset of alternatives A 2 A, a population 2 produces a vector of scores s(A; ) 2 A that has as components the score of each alternative in A. Since these scores are linear in , so is s(A; ). The scoring map S is a stack of all of these vectors. The result is established by showing that, except for a lower dimensional set of voting rules, the map S is onto: for any possible stack of scores 2 we can …nd a population 2 such that S( ) = . This means that we can generate any possible scores for each alternative and each subset and, thus, any choice function by varying the population of motivations. A key insight for the result is that, for a generic scoring rule, populations that achieve the same voting results (choices) for a subset of the domain B A, can achieve arbitrarily di¤erent results for subsets that are not in B. In particular, the voting results obtained for pairs of alternatives place no constraint on the results for larger subsets. Scoring rules have just enough degrees of freedom to make this possible.
De…nition 5 A voting rule v = ( 2 ; :::; n ) is said to be a generalized Borda rule if the k-alternative voting vector k , k 2 f2; :::; ng, satis…es
for j 2 f2; :::; k 1g.
Generalized Borda rules de…ne a lower dimensional family of scoring rules. These rules satisfy a form of consistency: Fix a set A 2 A, a 2 A, and let K(a; A) be the collection of jAj 1 subsets of A that contain a. It is easy to check that for any generalized Borda rule s(a; A; ) = 1 jAj 1 P B2K(a;A) s(a; B; ) for any population . That is, the score of a from A is just the average score of a across subsets in K(a; A). But then, s(a; B; ) is the average score of a across the jAj 2 subsets in K(a; B), and so on. Continuing with this recursion we conclude that for generalized Borda rules, the scores for any subset are fully determined by the scores obtained for pairs of alternatives. As a consequence, it will not be possible to explain all choice rules using generalized Borda rules as shown by Proposition 2 below.
De…nition 6
Fix a choice function c and A 2 A. Two alternatives x w ; x l 2 A are pairwise separated by A for c if (i) c(fx w ; xg) = x w for all x 2 Anfx w g and (ii) c(fx l ; xg) = x for all x 2 Anfx l g.
Condition (i) says that c has an alternative x w that is a "Condorcet winner" among those in A and (ii) says that x l is a "Condorcet loser" in A.
In particular, this means that each of the scores of x w in pairwise contests is higher than the scores obtained by x l in pairwise contests.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a choice function c is such that there exists a subset of three or more alternatives A 2 A such that (i) x w ; x l 2 A are pairwise separated by A for c and (ii) c(A) = x l . If v is a generalized Borda rule then there exists no explanation of c based on v, i.e., E(c; v) = ;.
Note that if jXj = 3, (i) and (ii) is equivalent to saying that c displays third-place choice. Condition (ii) says that even though x l is a Condorcet loser in A, it chosen when all alternatives in A are chosen. Proposition 2 illustrates the fact that by restricting the family of aggregation procedures, choice functions that exhibit certain types of irrationality will be ruled out.
Ordinal Welfare Inferences
This section presents the paper's main normative conclusions. Two tenets of welfare economics in the rational choice model are revealed preference -if x is chosen over y, x is better than y-and the fact that more choice is always better. We ask whether a limited forms of behavior consistency lead to similar welfare inferences even if choice data is not compatible with rational choice.
Pairwise Coherence
In the rational choice model choice and welfare are perfectly aligned: choices are consistent and if choice data reveals that x is always chosen over y this is because the decision-maker's welfare is higher under x than it is under y. Our welfare method allows for choice patterns that incompatible with rational choice. If this indeed the case but choice data is such that x is always chosen over y, can we infer that that welfare increases if the available set changes from a set A having y = c(A) to a set B having x = c(B)? This motivates a key concept of limited consistency: De…nition 7 A choice function c is said to be pairwise coherent with respect to (x; y) 2 X 2 if for any A that contains both x and y we have that c(A) 2 fx; yg ) c(A) = x.
Pairwise coherence is a version of the consistency axioms of rational choice theory valid for particular pair rather than all pairs. 24 In the case of threealternatives, there two type of choice functions that exhibit pairwise coherence. Using the notation introduced in section 3.1, the seemingly rational choice is pairwise coherent with respect to two pairs: (x r ; x s ) and (x s ; x t ). The second type are choice functions that display cyclic choice. If c displays cyclic choice and is given by (5), then c is pairwise coherent w.r.t (x; y).
Theorem 3 Let A; B 2 A with y = c(A) and x = c(B). If c is pairwise coherent with respect to (x; y) there exists an explanation 2 E(c) that puts weight exclusively on motivations that prefer x over y. In particular, c admits an ordinal welfare inference for a change in the available set from A to B.
Theorem 3 says that if c is such that x is always chosen over y, no matter how crazy the choice pattern c, there is always an explanation of the behavior that involves motivations which are not con ‡icted with respect to this pair of alternatives. As a consequence, for this choice function, one can never rule out a welfare improvement if opportunities change from a set where y is chosen to one where x is chosen. It also worth to point out that if c is pairwise coherent w.r.t. (x; y) there is an upper bound of 1=2 on the strength of motivations that prefer y over x. 25 The following Proposition is a partial converse to Theorem 3. We …rst introduce a non-generic set of scoring rules.
De…nition 8 A scoring rule v = ( 2 ; :::; jXj ) has equal components if for some k 2 f2; :::; jXjg; j 1 ; j 2 with 1 j 1 < j 2 k we have
k . 24 The choice functions compatible with rational choice are those satisfying Houtakker's axiom. Let a; a 0 2 X and c aa 0 = fA 2 Aj c(A) 2 fa; a 0 gg. One version of this axiom is as follows: For any pair of alternatives a and a 0 , either a 2 c(A) for all A 2 c aa 0 or else a 0 2 c(A) for all A 2 c aa 0 . If c(A) is a singleton for all A 2 c aa 0 , one can replace "2" with "=". Hence, the axiom just says that for c there are no "preference reversals": ignoring indi¤erences, either a is "revealed preferred" to a 0 or vice-versa. Pairwise coherence establishes the same for a particular pair a = x and a 0 = y. 25 This is immediately inferred from c(fx; yg) = x.
Scoring rules with equal components are sometimes non-responsive to switches in preference orders, or "rank-insensitive".
Theorem 4
If c is not pairwise coherent w.r.t. (x; y) and v does not have equal components there exists no explanation 2 E(c; v) that puts weight exclusively on motivations that prefer one alternative over the other.
The Theorem says that whenever there is con ‡icting choice data about the revealed preference between two alternatives, all explanations that rely on "rank-sensitive" scoring rules arise from population of motivations that are con ‡icted with respect to these alternatives.
Utilitarian Bounds and the Value of Expansions
This section explores welfare inference when non-choice cardinal information is available. We remain agnostic about the speci…c source of this "welfare information" and focus on general methodological and normative issues that arise from non-choice information with choice information in the evaluation of welfare. The method described in section 2.3 gives rise to a family of utilitarian welfare measures, one for each population 2 E(c) consistent with the choice observations. The practical use of this program rests on the ability to compute these measures e¢ ciently. We start by showing how to exploit the structure of the set of explanations E(c) to derive welfare bounds. Next, we illustrate how to use these bounds to determine whether an expansion of the set of opportunities is bene…cial or harmful. In contrast to the results from the previous section and traditional revealed preference which focus the existence on non-con ‡icted explanations, we are interested in welfare inferences that are valid across all the explanations of a choice function c for a given cardinalization u.
Welfare Bounds and Basic Voting Rules
We describe how to obtain bounds for two sets of welfare measures. where r 2 R . It follows that the extremal values will be realized at an extreme point of E(c). However, E(c) is a union of polyhedra which, in general, is not itself a polyhedron nor even a convex set. In principle, …nding the extreme points of an arbitrary set can be hard. For each j 2 f1; :::; k 1g, k 2, let e j k be the k component vector having its …rst j components equal to one and its last k j components equal to zero.
k is said to be basic if k = e j k for some j 2 f1; :::; k 1g. A voting rule v = ( 2 ; :::; n ) is said to be basic if for each k 2 f2; :::; jXjg vector k is a basic voting vector. The set of basic voting rules is denoted by V basic .
It is easy to verify that if n = jXj, there are (n 1)! basic voting rules. If jXj = 3 the only two basic voting rules are Plurality and Antiplurality. Corollary 1 Suppose that jXj = 3. Let v P and v A denote respectively the Plurality and Antilplurality scoring rules. Each of the bounds de…ned by (8) and (10) over all explanations is attained by a population which is either a vertex of the polytope E(c; v P ) or a vertex of E(c; v A ).
To compute an upper bound it su¢ ces to solve two LP, one where the feasible set is E(c; v P ) and one in which the feasible set is E(c; v A ). The upper bound is simply the highest of the values associated to these LP. Similarly, lower bounds are obtained by solving two linear minimization programs, one where the feasible set is E(c; v P ) and one in which the feasible set is E(c; v A ). The lower bound is the minimum of the values associated to these LP.
Surely Bene…cial and Surely Harmful Expansions
Consider an expansion F = (A; B), where A B. If we observe a choice pattern c, what can we say about the set of welfare measures associated to the expansion W (F; c; u)? Our goal is to identify restrictions on the u and c that allow to determine whether an expansion is surely bene…cial or surely harmful. If an expansion does not change the choice then the welfare change is trivially zero. We restrict attention to expansions in F(c), i.e., those associated to changes in the choice.
Since the welfare measure is an average across the population, these restrictions depend crucially on two variables, the relative strength of motivations favored by the expansion vis a vis those hurt by it, and the magnitude of the gains and losses associated to each group of motivations.
Given a choice rule c and an expansion F = (A; B) 2 F(c), let + (F; c) = f 2 j c(B) (A)g be the set of motivations that gain from the expansion. The set of motivations that are hurt by the expansion is (F; c) = + (F; c). measures the relative strength of these motivations. For a symmetric cardinalization pro…le in which all motivations have the same utilities, this number is su¢ cient to determine whether an expansion is bene…cial or harmful at . However, we may not be able to compute this measure as is not directly observed. Knowing that 2 E(c) it is possible to estimate the upper and lower bounds given by
and
Here + (F; c) = min 2E(c) + (F; c; ) and + (F; c) = max 2E(c) + (F; c; ). Since + (F; c; ) is linear in , Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 can be used to calculate these numbers.
Finally, we introduce notation for bounds on the gains and losses associated to an expansion F 2 F(c) for a …xed cardinalization u. Let g(u; F; c) = min 2 + (F;c) j u(F; X; c; )j respectively G(u; F; c) = max 2 + (F;c) j u(F; c; )j be the smallest respectively largest gain across motivations that bene…t from the expansion. Let l(u; F; c) = min 2 (F;c) j u(F; c; )j respectively L(u; F; c) = max 2 (F;c) j u(F; c; )j be the smallest respectively largest loss across motivations hurt by the expansion. The main result of this section is as follows:
Theorem 5 Fix a cardinalization u, a choice rule c, and a choice-varying expansion F 2 F(c).
Theorem 5 provides two "likelihood ratio test" conditions. 26 The left hand side of the inequality in (i) is an upper bound on the loss of a motivation hurt by the expansion relative to the gain from a motivation that bene…ts from it. The right hand side is a lower bound on the ratio of the strengths of motivations that bene…t and those that lose from the expansion. These ratios are independent of u: Lemma 2 below provides these bounds for each possible c and F 2 F(c) in the case jXj = 3. The condition says that if the relative loss is small relative to the strengths ratio an expansion is surely bene…cial for that cardinalization. The second condition compares a lower bound of the relative loss with an upper bound of the strengths ratio. If satis…ed an expansion is surely detrimental for that cardinalization. The example below illustrates that these bounds are tight.
De…nition 11 Fix a choice rule c. An expansion F = (A; B) 2 F(c) is said to be pairwise coherent if c is pairwise coherent with respect to (c(B); c(A) ).
Observe that, from Theorem 3, if F is a pairwise coherent then (F; c) = +1. Hence, for a pairwise coherent expansion the hypothesis of (ii) will not be satis…ed for any cardinalization u. This means that pairwise coherent expansions are always bene…cial at some explanation, something we already knew from Theorem 3.
Using Corollary 1 we obtain the following:
Lemma 2 Suppose that jXj = 3. Fix a choice rule c and a choice-varying expansion F 2 F(c). and (F; c) = 1 if F is not pairwise coherent.
Larger values of are associated with a higher presence of motivations that bene…t from the expansion. The strength of motivations that bene…t from expansions is highest for seemingly rational choice rules. Cyclic choice seems to dominate second-place and third-place choice functions in this dimension. Interestingly, the upper and lower bounds associated to the pairwise coherent expansion for cyclic choice are exactly the same than those associated to the only choice-varying expansion for seemingly rational choice (which is also pairwise coherent).
Example 7 Harmful expansion with Seemingly Rational choice
Suppose that X = fx; y; zg. Let c be the seemingly rational choice function described by (6) and A = fy; zg. Consider the expansion F = (A; X) and observe that c(A) = y and c(X) = x. The set of motivations that gain is + (F; c) = f 1 ; 2 ; 5 g and (F; c) = f 3 ; 4 ; 6 g. Consider a cardinalization u such that u(F; c; ) = 1 for all 2 + (F; c) and u(F; c; ) = (1 + ) for all 2 (F; c), > 0. Thus, g = G = 1 and L = l = 1 + . From Lemma 2, (F; c) = 1. Thus, this cardinalization violates the hypothesis of of Theorem 5 (i) as > 0. We show that at some explanation W < 0. Indeed, for a small > 0, consider the population de…ned by
It is easy to verify that and any voting rule v explains c. The welfare change for this pro…le is
Clearly, for any there exists an small enough such that W < 0.
The example illustrates two issues. First, the hypothesis of Theorem 5 (i) is tight: a small departure from the condition ( is arbitrary) can reverse the conclusion. The same is true for the hypothesis of (ii). Secondly, it also shows that expansions can be harmful even if observed behavior is consistent with rationality, as would be the case for an individual who consistently chooses a self-destructive outcome. 27 
Example 8 Combining non-choice with choice data in welfare analysis
Suppose that X = fx; y; zg. Using non-choice data, the analyst has learned that q = L(u; F; c) g(u; F; c) 2 (1=3; 1) for any choice function c and any expansion F . 28 From Lemma 2 and 5 (i), after observing c, the analyst concludes that an expansion is bene…cial at all explanations only c is seemingly rational or c is cyclic and F is pairwise coherent.
Conclusion
We have modeled potentially non-rational choice as a con ‡ict between simultaneously held motivations with possibly di¤erent strengths. We assume, following the long-standing tradition of revealed preference theory, that the individual's choice is observed and we seek to describe it "as if" it arose from the aggregation of con ‡icting preferences. In this paper we have restricted ourselves to aggregation rules that are purely ordinal, taking the form of a scoring rule.
The task of economic analysis is to determine which con ‡icting preferences could give rise to the observed choice function. Once these preferences are known, welfare analysis can use them to evaluate the e¢ cacy of any given change in the set of alternatives that is available. We have given a general method under which this program can be carried out. The principal bene…t from using our method to …nd the set of underlying preferences is that we can use these preferences to measure welfare changes for choice patterns that are not necessarily compatible with the maximization of a single preference.
Our theory shows that all choice patterns are in fact possible as the result of the aggregation of con ‡icting motivations by voting methods that are scoring rules. Interestingly, in the case of three alternatives, there are four possible patterns of choice and all have been experimentally observed. We also show that a priori restrictions of the set of motivations or scoring rules can reduce the patterns of behavior explained by the theory.
In the absence of cardinal information, the existence of an explanation that is non-con ‡icted with respect to a change in the choice associated to a changes in opportunities is the natural extension of traditional ordinal welfare inferences. We identify a limited consistency condition -pairwise coherenceand …nd that some of the traditional revealed preference inferences hold for choice data that satis…es it.
If non-choice information about the intensity of preferences is available, it can be used to produce a set utilitarian welfare measures one for each explanation consistent with the observed data. We show how to compute bounds on the set of welfare changes associated to a change in the set of available opportunities. In the case of an expansion of the available alternatives, we show that there are some changes that are surely bene…cial while others may or may not be bene…cial, and we demonstrate the sensitivity of this result choice function that has been observed and to the cardinalization of utilities that represent the intensity of preference within each motivation. We illustrate the fact that welfare inferences based on cardinal information can contradict ordinal welfare inferences based purely on choice data.
In future work we will try to allow for con ‡icting motivations to be aggregated by rules that incorporate some of the cardinal information available. We will also look for criteria under which some explanations can be dropped and others can be highlighted. The aim in all these endeavors will be to provide sharper welfare inferences than those available from the method in the present paper alone.
A Example
We let % = 0:3, meaning that each period of delay in consumption reduces the utility of consumption to 0:74 of its prior value. It is easiest to take the logarithm of the utility, obtaining h i (a) = ia %t a ; where ia = lnũ i (m a ). We want to insure that the preferences captured by the functions u i do in fact rank the three pairs (x a ; t a ) in all six of the possible orders. We also need to respect the monotonicity of theũ i , which requires ix < iy < iz for i = 1; :::; 6. Consider the following values for the parameters ia : Using these ia it can be veri…ed that
Thus, each motivation u i has a di¤erent ranking over the alternatives. It is also convenient that the realized values h i (a) = 0:2; 0:15 and 0:1, depending on whether a is …rst, second, or third in the order speci…ed by preference i. It can also be veri…ed that eachũ j is risk averse over the three possible payo¤s, 10, 15 and 35.
B Proofs B.1 Explanations Proof of Lemma 1
We omit reference to the voting rule v which is assumed to be …xed. Let n = jXj and Q = jAj = 2 n n 1 be the number of subsets of two or more alternatives. The number of orderings over X is j j = n!.
We start by noting that any explanation 2 can be decomposed as = + e j j
, where e 2 R is a vector of ones. Hence,
is the explanation that assigns equal weight to each preference in and is the deviation from this explanation. Since is in the simplex, the deviation vector satis…es e T = 0. Note also that, for any explanation and any subset A, adding the scores across alternatives in A gives the total number of points W A = P jAj j=1 j jAj , which is independently of . This means that, for each subset and each for deviation , the scores of alternatives add up to zero . For any subset A, the pro…le e j j yields the same score for each alternative a 2 A. The result is established if we show that, for any c it is always possible to …nd a deviation that breaks these ties as speci…ed by c. This is done by showing that we can achieve any possible scores for each subset as we vary the deviation 2 = fx 2 R j e T x = 0g. We need to introduce some notation. Each voting rule induces a linear scoring map S : R ! E, where E = A2A R jAj . To each vector x 2 R we associate the score of alternative a from subset A 2 A
where A is the jAj 1 voting vector for a subset of size jAj and P aA is a jAj j j matrix. The i element of this matrix is P aA i = ir(a;A; ) where r(a; A; ) is the ranking of alternative a in A for motivation . The vector of scores s(A; x) for subset A is an element of R jAj and the stack of all of these vectors is S(x), an element of E. Observe that the dimension of E is M = P n k=2 n k k as there are n k subsets of k 2 alternatives (M = 2 n 1 n Q). The domain R is a linear space that can be decomposed into two subspaces = fx 2 R j e T x = 0g and the space orthogonal to it, ? , which is spanned by the vector e . Clearly, dim( ) = 1 and dim( ? ) = 1 and each x 2 R can be written as x = x + x ? , with x 2 and x ? 2 ? . Similarly, let = fs 2 R
A j e T A s = 0g and =
A2A
A . Note that is a set of scores that sum to zero for each subset and, as argued earlier, S( ) . The codomain E can be decomposed into and the space ? orthogonal to it. Since is de…ned by one constraint for each of the Q subsets in A, we have that dim( ) = M Q and dim( ? ) = Q.
To establish the Lemma it su¢ ces to show that for any vector of scores s 2 there is a deviation vector 2 such that s = S( ), that is, S( ) = . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: If dim(ker(S)) = Q 1 then S( ) = .
Since S( ) , we have that S( ) = if dim(S( )) = dim( ). Now, dim( ) = M Q so the previous holds if and only if dim(S( )) = M Q. We show that the latter holds if and only if if dim(ker(S)) = Q 1.
By the dimension decomposition theorem we know that
We also know that dim(S( ? )) = 1 as dim( ? ) = 1 and, by construction,
Combining the previous we have
and the conclusion follows.
Step 2: dim(ker(S)) = Q 1 Let L be the matrix associated to S. We establish Step 2 by showing that for any 2 E satisfying L T = 0 then aA = A for each a 2 A, and P A2A A = 0. That is, the nullspace of L T is de…ned by one parameter per subset and these parameters must sum to zero, which means that it has dimension Q 1. We use induction k = f2; :::; ng over the size of each subset.
We introduce some notation. Let A k = fA 2 Aj jAj kg be the family containing all subsets of k or more alternatives, k = f2; :::; ng. Clearly, A 2 = A and A k is decreasing. For each each 2 de…ne
It is straightforward to check that if satis…es L T = 0 we have that X (12) we get
, which completes the initial step.
Our induction hypothesis is that aA = A for each a 2 A and jAj = k 1. We need to show that the previous is also satis…ed for subsets of k alternatives. Indeed,
and, using the induction hypothesis, we have that
where
jAj which is independent of . Hence, using (12) we con-
where c k is a constant independent of 2 . Invoking Lemma 3 again, there exist 0 ; 00 2 0 and 00 such that s(a; A; 0 ) = s(a; A; 00 ) for all a 2 A, A 2 A k nfBg. Further, s(b 1 ; B; 0 ) = s(b 2 ; B; 00 ) = 1 and s(b 2 ; B; 0 ) = s(b 1 ; B; 0 ) = 0. Using this and (13) we conclude that, for any B, and fb 1 ; b 2 g B, with jBj = k, we have that
Since b 1 and b 2 are arbitrary elements of B and this is an arbitrary subset of size k, we conclude that bB = B for any such set. The induction is complete. Proof. We provide a complete argument for v 2 fv P ; v A g, where v P is Plurality and v A is Antiplurality. Fix B 2 A and a pair fb 1 ; b 2 g B. We construct preferences and b that give rise to identical scores for all alternatives in subsets other than B having jBj or more alternatives. We also show that s(a; B; ) = s(a; B; b ) unless a 2 fb 1 ; b 2 g. We later explain how to extend the argument for a general v.
Consider to be a preference such that b 1 b 2 and there are there are no elements of X ranked between alternatives b 1 and b 2 . Let b be identical to except for the fact that b 2 b 1 , i.e., b 1 and b 2 have been permuted. Observe that and b induce the same order over any subset of alternatives that does not contain the pair fb 1 ; b 2 g. In particular, for any A such that fb 1 ; b 2 g * A, we have that s(a; A; ) = s(a; A; b ) for each a 2 A. Throughout the proof we consider and b as above.
Suppose that v = v P . Let M (A; e ) denote the maximal element in A for preference e 2 and observe that, for Plurality, this is the only alternative that receives a score of one (all others get a zero score). 
Proof of Proposition 2
We start by showing by induction that, for a generalized Borda rule, scores satisfy s(a; A; ) = jAj X a 0 2Anfag
s(a; fa; a 0 g; );
that is, the score of an alternative a 2 A is proportional to the sum of scores obtained by in pairwise contests with the other alternatives in A. We proceed by induction over the size of A. For jAj = 3 this is immediate: The Borda score a is the simple average of the score of a against the other two alternatives in A, so 3 = 1 2
. Our induction hypothesis is that (14) holds for any set B such that jBj = k. Let A be a set of size k +1. From the main text, we have that s(a; A; ) = 1 k 1 P B2K(a;A) s(a; B; ) and using the induction hypothesis s(a; B; ) = k P a 0 2Bnfag s(a; fa; a 0 g; ). Combining these we get
s(a; fa; a 0 g; )
where we used the fact that each alternative a 0 6 = a appears in k 2 of the k 1 sets in K(a; A): We conclude that (14) is satis…ed for A setting
k . This completes the induction. Note that the linearity of the scores s(a; A; ) in implies that (14) holds changing for any population . Note also that s(a; fa; a 0 g; ) is simply the strength of motivations that prefer a to a 0 for population . Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists an explanation of c based on a generalized Borda count satisfying (i) and (ii) of the Proposition's hypothesis. This means that s(a; A; ) < s(x l ; A; ) for all a 6 = x l and all explanatory population . Now, if c satis…es (i) and (ii) in the Proposition's hypothesis, it must be that for any 2 E(c) we s( 
B.2 Ordinal Welfare Inferences
Proof of Theorem 3 Suppose that c is pairwise coherent w.r.t. (x; y). We establish the result by constructing a family of explanations based on Plurality with populations that have support S xy = f 2 jx y and @a such that x a yg, i.e., the subset of xy consisting of rankings that have no alternatives ranked between x and y.
We start by introducing some notation. Let x = 2 X be an auxiliary alternative that replaces x and/or y in each subset that originally contained one or both of these. To be precise, let X = Xnfxg and consider map g : X ! X g(a) = a if a = 2 fx; yg x if a 2 fx; yg:
For each A 2 A, g(A) denotes the image of A under g. Observe that g(A) = A if A does not contain either x or y and, otherwise, g(A) = Anfx; yg [ fxg. Let A be denote the collection of subsets of X of two or more elements, be the set of orderings over X, and be the simplex of populations on . Next, we introduce an auxiliary choice function c de…ned on the "reduced" domain A rather than A. For each set T that does not contain either x or y, let
Hence, Q(T; c) is the set of choices under c for subsets that add x; y; or both to T and Q g (T; c) is the image of this set under g. Observe that that the image of T [ K for each nonempty K fx; yg under g is always T [ fxg.
Consider the choice function c : A ! A de…ned by
The choice function c reproduces c for choice instances that do not contain x and imposes a tie for alternatives in Q g (Anfxg; c) if x 2 A. Note that Q g (Anfxg; c) is a singleton if c is independent w.r.t. fx; yg. For any 2 that explains c , we construct and an explanation of c with the desired property. For this purpose, we introduce the one-to-one map h : ! S xy that assigns to each preference pro…le 2 the ranking = h( ) 2 S xy satisfying a x ) a x and x a ) y a. That is, the order h( ) is such that alternatives x and y are inserted as a stack in place of x respecting order . Let H : ! be the map de…ned by = H( ) if (h( )) = ( ). By construction, H( ) 2 xy for any . We claim that if explains c then H( ) explains c. The claim is shown in two steps: 
where s(a; A; ) is the Plurality score of a from alternatives in A X and 2 , and b s(a; A; ) is the Plurality score of a from alternatives in A X and 2 . Indeed, we can express A as A = T [ K, where T \ fx; yg = ; and either K = ; or K is a non-empty subset of fx; yg. If K = ;, so that A = A, the ranking of alternatives in A under h( ) is the same as the ranking of alternatives in A under (for any ). Instead, if K = fzg with z 2 fx; yg, the ranking of alternatives in A under h( ) is the same than the ranking of alternatives in A = T [ fxg under replacing z for x (for any ). Thus, s(a; A; ) = b s(a; A; ) if fx; yg A. Finally, consider the case K = fx; yg, so that A = AnK [ fxg. Since x is ranked better than y by h( ) for any 2 , y is not ranked …rst in A by any motivation in the support of . Thus, for Plurality, s(y; A; ) = 0. On the other hand, if a is ranked …rst in A by h( ) then a = g(a) is ranked …rst in A by . Hence, s(a; A; ) = b s(a; A; ) for a 6 = y.
Step 2: If A does not contain either x or y, g de…ned on A is the identity and, from (16) , there is also a one-to-one correspondence between the scores of H( ) for alternatives in A and the scores of alternatives in g(A). Further c(A) = c (A). Since explains c , b s(c (A); A; ) > b s(a; A; ) for each a 6 = c (A), from which s(c(A); A; H( )) > s(a; A; H( )) for each a 6 = c(A). Consider the case either x or y are in A, so that A = g(A) contains x. If A contains only one of these alternatives then, from (15) and (16) , it is straightforward to verify that the scores of alternatives in A\Q(Anfxg; c) are equal to each other and greater than the score of any other alternative in A. Since c(A) 2 Q(Anfxg; c), we have that s(c(A); A; H( )) s(a; A; H( )) for each a 6 = c(A). Finally, if fx; yg A, the previous holds replacing Q(Anfxg; c) with Q(Anfxg; c)nfyg. We conclude that H( ) 2 E(c).
Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that c is not pairwise-coherent w.r.t. (x; y) and, without loss of generality, assume that x = c(fx; yg). This means that if there exists 2 E(c) that puts weight only on motivations that unanimously rank these alternatives, it must be that they rank x over y (x = c(fx; yg) implies a weight of at least 1=2 on such motivations).
Since c is not pairwise coherent w.r.t. (x; y), there exists a choice instance B such that fx; yg B and y = c(B). Let v be a scoring rule such that 2 E(c; v). Let s(x; y; B; ) = s(x; B; ) s(y; B; ), the di¤erence in scores between x and y for motivation under voting rule v. Comparing the scores of x and y in B we have that X 2 s(x; y; B; ) ( ) 0:
Let xy = f 2 jx yg and yx = f 2 jy xg. By assumption, we have that xy = P Since s(x; y; B; ) 0 for any 2 xy , the previous can only be satis…ed if it is satis…ed with equality and s(x; y; B; ) = 0 for each 2 xy such that ( ) > 0:
Given xy = 1, there is always some e 2 xy having (e ) > 0. Let = r(x; B; e ) 2 f1; :::jBj 1g and 0 = r(y; B; e ) 2 f2; :::jBjg be respectively the rank of x and y from alternatives in B for motivation e . Since, e 2 xy , we have that 0 > and the scoring vector jBj for subsets of jBj alternatives must satisfy is jBj = +1 jBj = ::: = 0 jBj .
B.3 Utilitarian Bounds
Proof of Proposition 3 Let v = ( 2 ; :::; n ) be a voting system and recall that the score of an alternative a for a subset A for a population can be written as s(a; A; ) = t jAj P aA , where P aA is the jAj matrix described in the proof of Lemma 1. Scores are bilinear in jAj and . For a …xed choice function c, let Q where the q aA 's and p are the Lagrange multipliers associated to (18) , and +k and k are vectors of Lagrange multipliers associated to (19) . For each k, basic voting vectors are the extreme points of V k . Hence, the linearity of L with respect to each k implies that there exists a basic voting rule that attains Z(c; r). The result follows from the above two inequalities.
from A 1 = fy; zg to X changes the choice from y to x. This expansion is pairwise coherent so, by Theorem 3, we know there exists some 2 E(c) such that + (F 1 ; c; ) = 1. Hence c(F 1 ; c) = 1 and (F; c) = +1. Since c(fx; yg) = x, the strength of motivations that prefer x to y is at least 1=2 for any 2 E(c). If = yxz and 0 = zxy , the population such that ( ) = ( 0 ) = 1=2 with Antiplurality explains c and + (F 1 ; c; ) = 1=2, so the bound is attained. Hence, (F 1 ; c) = 1=2 and (F 1 ; c) = 1. The second choice-varying expansion is F 2 from A 2 = fx; zg to X, which changes the choice from z to x. Since c(fx; zg) = z, the we have that + (F 2 ; c; ) 1=2 for any 2 E(c). Using Corollary 1 we …nd that (F 2 ; c) = 1=2 which is attained by the population such that ( ) = ( 0 ) = 1=2 with = yxz and 0 = zxy. This explains c with Antiplurality. Once again, the same result we …nd that (F 2 ; c) = 1=4 which is achieved by a vertex of E(c; v A ).
